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Abstract Coordinated action relies on shared representa-
tions between interaction partners: people co-represent
actionsofothersinordertorespondappropriately.However,
little is known about the social factors that inﬂuence shared
representations. We investigated whether actions performed
by in-group and out-group members are represented differ-
ently, and if so, what role perspective-taking plays in this
process. White participants performed a joint Simon task
with an animated image of a hand with either white or black
skin tone. Results of study I demonstrated that actions per-
formed by in-group members were co-represented while
actions of out-group members were not. In study II, it was
found that participants co-represented actions of out-group
members when they had read about an out-group member
and to take his perspective prior to the actual experiment.
Possible explanations for these ﬁndings are discussed.
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Introduction
Observingtheactionsofothersleadstoautomaticactivation
of motor representations in the observer (Brass et al. 2001;
DijksterhuisandBargh2001;Sebanzetal.2003,2005;Prinz
1997), a phenomenon termed action co-representation.
Co-representation of actions is an essential process for
successful social interaction, supporting the understanding
of others’ actions, goals, and feelings of others (e.g., Preston
and de Waal 2002). Recent research demonstrated that rep-
resenting others’ actions is not as universally applicable as
previously suggested, but that higher-order processes can
have a strong impact on shared action representations. For
instance, co-representation only occurs when the interaction
partner is perceived as an intentional agent (Mu ¨ller et al.
2011; Tsai et al. 2008). Furthermore, it has been shown that
the valence of interpersonal interactions has a strong impact
on how people represent others and their actions (Hommel
et al. 2009). In their study, Hommel and colleagues dem-
onstrate that only positive interactions lead to action co-
representation, while negative interactions between jointly
acting participants eliminated co-representation of action.
The authors suggested that action co-representation is a
ﬂexible phenomenon that depends on social factors.
One of the most important social factors in human social
interactions is group membership. According to Social
Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979), people derive a
substantial part of their self-concept from membership in
social groups. It has been shown that out-group members
are evaluated more negatively than in-group members
(Brewer 1979), and that self-other overlap increases when
people belong to the same group (e.g., Aron et al. 2005).
Prior literature already demonstrated a modulation of
error-related brain activity during observation of actions
performed by in-group versus out-group members in a
competitive context (Newman-Norlund et al. 2009), and
differences in motor cortex activation during observation
of in-group versus out-group members’ actions were found
(Gutsell and Inzlicht 2009). Our ﬁrst study tries to extend
these ﬁndings by showing that even outside a competitive
context, actions performed by out-group members are
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members. Furthermore, as little is known about how ﬁxed
this moderation of co-representation by social factors may
be, study II was conducted to explore whether the inﬂuence
of social factors is ﬂexible, and whether this can be
manipulated by perspective taking.
In both studies, we used the joint Simon task to measure
action co-representation (Hommel et al. 2009; Sebanz et al.
2003; Tsai and Brass, 2007; Tsai et al. 2006). In the clas-
sical Simon task, participants respond to the colour of a
stimulus (e.g., pressing a left key when a red stimulus
appears or pressing a right key when a green stimulus
appears on the screen) while ignoring the spatial location of
the stimulus. The Simon effect refers to the ﬁnding that
participants respond slower when the spatial relationship
between stimulus and response is incompatible (e.g.,
pressing a left key in response to a stimulus on the right)
than when it is compatible (e.g., pressing a left key in
response to a stimulus on the left). The typical Simon effect
disappears when participants respond only to one stimulus
colour (e.g., to the green stimuli with a right response but
not to the red stimuli) in a go/no-go version of the task.
Probably, the reason is that a left response is only coded as
left when it is encoded in a context in which there are
meaningful right responses on the right. The Simon effect
reappears when participants perform the task jointly with
another personcarryingoutthealternativeresponse(Sebanz
et al. 2003). In a social setting, participants seemingly
co-represent the action of interaction partners in a manner
that leads to a reappearance of the Simon effect.
In the ﬁrst study, white participants performed a joint
Simon task, co-acting with either a white in-group member
or a black out-group member. We expected that the actions
of an in-group member would be co-represented, whereas




Twenty-seven white students from the Radboud University
Nijmegen participated in this experiment (22 women;
17–26 years). They received course credit or ﬁnancial
compensation for their participation. All participants were
right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Experimental design, materials and procedure
The experiment consisted of a 2 (hand colour: white vs.
black) 9 2 (compatibility: compatible vs. incompatible)
repeated-measures design, with hand colour and compat-
ibility as within-subject factors. All participants per-
formed the same joint Simon task, which is essentially a
go/no-go task. They put their right hand on the right-
handed side of a 17 LCD screen, where a single response
key was located. At the centre of the screen, the standard
Simon stimulus was presented, a rectangle surrounding
three horizontally arranged circles. In each trial, one of
the circles was coloured either green or red. In all con-
ditions, an image of either a white or black left hand was
displayed along the left-hand side of the screen in each
trial. These hands differed only in skin colour and were
matched for shape and size (Fig. 1). Participants were
instructed to press the response key with their right hand
whenever a red dot appeared on the screen, regardless of
the position of the dot. The hand displayed along the left
side ‘responded’ to green dots, thus pressing a button on
participants’ no-go trials. A ﬁve-frame image sequence
(38 ms per frame) was presented, showing the hand in a
series of postures with the index ﬁnger approaching the
response button. The ﬁrst image of this sequence was
used as a ﬁxation display.
No-go trials were preceded by a 500-ms ﬁxation display.
A green target was then presented for 150 ms. After a
variable interval (300–450 ms), the image sequence star-
ted. Lastly, a ﬁxation display was presented (1,000 ms). Go
trials also started with a 500-ms ﬁxation display. Next, a
red target was presented for 150 ms. RTs were measured
from the onset of the target. Participants were instructed to
respond for red targets as quickly as possible, without
making too many errors. Response times (RTs) were
recorded from the onset of the target. Participants were
instructed to respond to the red targets as quickly as pos-
sible, without making errors.
The experiment included 45 go trials and 45 no-go trials
for both the white and the black hand conditions (20 go/
compatible trials; 20 go/incompatible trials; 5 go/neutral
trials where the target was presented in the centre position).
All participants performed two blocks of the joint Simon
task, one with a white hand and one with a black hand. The
order of these blocks was counterbalanced across subjects.
To prevent carry-over effects between conditions, a 2-min
break between blocks was employed.
Results and discussion
All trials with reaction times (RTs) above 1,500 ms or
below 150 ms (3 trials, 0.1%) were excluded from further
analyses. RTs were log-transformed but untransformed
RTs are reported in ms. Difference scores were calculated
by subtracting the average RT of compatible trials from the
average RT of incompatible trials. Two participants with
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from further analysis.
A 2 (hand colour: white vs. black) 9 2 (compatibility:
compatible vs. incompatible) GLM repeated-measures
analysis revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of compatibility;
participants were slower on incompatible trials (M = 379;
SE = 10) than on compatible trials (M = 369; SE = 10),
F(1,24) = 15.36, P = .001, gq
2 = .39. The main effect of
hand colour was not signiﬁcant, F(1,24) = 1.95, P = .18.
Furthermore, a signiﬁcant interaction between hand colour
and compatibility was obtained, F(1,24) = 4.82, P = .04,
gq
2 = .17 (Fig. 2). Bonferroni-corrected post hoc com-
parisons revealed that with a co-acting white agent, par-
ticipants showed the expected compatibility effect, with
slower RTs for incompatible trials (M = 385; SE = 9)
than on compatible trials (M = 370; SE = 9), F(1,24) =
19.08, P = .001, gq
2 = .44. However, no compatibility
effect occurred with a co-acting black agent, F(1,24) =
2.04, P = .17.
In sum, whereas participants were faster for compatible
than on incompatible trials when interacting with a white
in-group member, no compatibility effect was obtained for
interactions with a black out-group member. Thus, actions
were co-represented only when both actor and co-actor
belonged to the same group, thereby supporting ﬁndings
demonstrating that higher-order processes can inﬂuence
action co-representation (Hommel et al. 2009;M u ¨ller et al.
2011). In study II, we explored how ﬂexible these biases
are by instructing participants to take the perspective of an
out-group member before interacting with another member
of the same out-group. We predicted that by taking the
perspective of an out-group member the lack of compati-
bility effects in interactions with black out-group members
would be eliminated.
Study II
Research on stereotypes demonstrated that both the
expression and accessibility of stereotypes for out-group
members decrease after perspective taking (Galinsky and
Moskowitz 2000), and that taking the perspective of an out-
group member results in more positive attitudes towards
out-group members (Batson et al. 1997; Batson et al.
2002). For example, people are more likely to ascribe self-
descriptive traits onto a target person after taking that
person’s perspective (Davis et al. 1996). Moreover, per-
spective takers better understand the actions of others
(Lozano et al. 2006). Galinsky et al. (2005) suggested that
these positive consequences of perspective-taking result
from increased self-other overlap in cognitive representa-
tions (see also Davis et al. 1996). Based on these ﬁndings,
we hypothesised that taking the perspective of an out-group
member would lead to stronger co-representation of the
out-group member’s actions. In the second study, white
participants read a story about either a white in-group
member or a black out-group member (a Surinamese man,
member of a stigmatised immigrant group in the Nether-
lands; Verkuyten and Thijs 2002) and were asked to take
the perspective of the main character, before performing a
joint Simon task with a white or black co-actor (displayed
as a hand on the monitor).
Fig. 1 Sample frames of the white hand (a) and black hand (b)
Fig. 2 Mean reaction times of the joint Simon task as a function of
interaction partner (white vs. black) and compatibility (compatible vs.
incompatible trials)
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Participants
Forty-three white undergraduate students from the Rad-
boud University Nijmegen participated in the study (37
women; 18–31 years). They received course credit or
ﬁnancial compensation for their participation. All partici-
pants were right-handed and had normal to corrected-to-
normal vision. Participants were randomly assigned to one
of the two experimental conditions. None of the partici-
pants took part in study I.
Experimental design and procedure
The experiment had a 2 (story: in-group vs. out-group) 9 2
(hand colour: white vs. black) 9 2 (compatibility: com-
patible vs. incompatible) mixed model design, with story as
between-subjects factor, and hand colour and compatibility
as within-subjects factors.
Participants read a short story about a law student and
were instructed to take the perspective of the main char-
acter while reading. In the ‘in-group’ condition the main
character was introduced as a white student from the
Netherlands, in the ‘out-group’ condition as a black student
from Suriname. After reading the story, all participants
performed the same joint Simon tasks described in study I,
with an animation of either a white hand or a black hand.
Results
All trials with RTs above 1500 ms or below 150 ms (7
trials, 0.4%) were excluded from further analysis. Differ-
ence scores were calculated by subtracting the average RT
of compatible trials from the average RT of incompatible
trials. The RTs were log-transformed, but untransformed
mean RTs are reported in ms. Difference scores were
calculated by subtracting the average RT of compatible
trials from the average RT of incompatible trials. One
participant with difference scores more than 2.5 SDs above
the mean, and two participants with mean RTs were 3 SDs
above the mean were excluded from further analysis.
A 2 (story: in-group vs. out-group) 9 2 (hand colour:
white vs. black) 9 2 (compatibility: compatible vs.
incompatible) GLM-repeated measures analysis revealed a
signiﬁcant main effect of compatibility: participants were
slower on incompatible trials (M = 386; SE = 6) than on
compatible trials (M = 371; SE = 5), F(1,38) = 27.98,
P = .001, gq
2 = .42. No effect of hand colour
(F(1,38) = 1.28, P = .26), or any signiﬁcant two-way
interaction (all F0s\1) were found. As predicted, the
three-way interaction was signiﬁcant, F(1,38) = 4.26,
P = .05, gq
2 = .10 (Fig. 3). For both stories, a compati-
bility effect was obtained with a co-acting white agent,
F(1,38) = 18.04, P = .001, gq
2 = .32 (Fig. 3a); Partici-
pants were faster for compatible trials than on incompatible
trials irrespective of taking the perspective of a in-group
member or an out-group member (story in-group:
t(20) = 3.43, P = .003; story out-group: t(18) = 2.60,
P = .02). More importantly, the occurrence of a compati-
bility effect with a co-acting black agent depended on
whether participants took the perspective of an in-group
member or out-group member, F(1,38) = 4.11, P = .05,
gq
2 = .10 (Fig. 3b). There was no compatibility effect for
the black agent when participants read the story about an
in-group member, t(20)\1, n.s. However, a compatibility
effect was found when they read the story about an out-
group member, t(18) = 4.14, P = .001.
General discussion
In the present research, we investigated whether action co-
representation differs depending on group-membership of
an interaction partner and whether this difference could be
overcome by taking the perspective of an out-group
member. The results of our ﬁrst study demonstrated that
actions of out-group members are co-represented differ-
ently than actions of in-group members. While participants
co-represent actions only for a white in-group member,
they did not co-represent actions of a black out-group
member. In the second study, co-representation of an out-
group member’s action could be induced by instructing
participants to take the perspective of an out-group member
before performing the Simon task. Participants taking the
perspective of an in-group member still only co-repre-
sented actions of a white, but not of a black interaction
partner. However, participants who ﬁrst took the perspec-
tive of an out-group member showed compatibility effects
when interacting with both a white agent and a black agent.
Recent research showed that higher-order processes
have a strong inﬂuence on whether people co-represent
actions of others or not (Gutsell and Inzlicht 2009; Hom-
mel et al. 2009;M u ¨ller et al. 2011). In line with these
ﬁndings, we demonstrate that actions of out-group mem-
bers are indeed co-represented substantially less than
actions performed by in-group members. Depending on
social factors like group-membership, the overlap between
representations of one’s own actions and representation of
actions of others is reduced. However, these differences in
action co-representation are not stable but ﬂexible and can
be eliminated by increasing perspective taking between
members from different social groups. Whereas, prior lit-
erature already demonstrated a modulation of error-related
brain activity during observation of actions performed by
426 Exp Brain Res (2011) 211:423–428
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(Newman-Norlund et al. 2009), and differences in motor
cortex activation during observation of in-group vs. out-
group members’ actions (Gutsell and Inzlicht 2009), the
present ﬁndings extend these results by using different
methods, and showing the same modulatory effect in the
absence of a competitive context.
Interestingly, it does not seem necessary to take the
perspective of a speciﬁc out-group member for action co-
representation to occur, but sufﬁcient to take the perspec-
tive of any member of the out-group, as demonstrated in
our second study. Indeed, previous literature demonstrated
that the positive consequences of taking the perspective of
one out-group member are generalised to the whole out-
group (Aron et al. 1991; Batson et al. 1997). After taking
the perspective of an out-group member, attitudes towards
the out-group become more positive, and these changes in
attitude can facilitate actual helping behaviour towards any
member of the out-group (Batson et al. 2002).
Perspective taking increases both positivity towards an
out-group, as well as self-other overlap with an out-group
interaction partner (Batson et al. 1997). This raises the
questionofwhetherincreasedself-otheroverlaporincreased
positivity is responsible for our ﬁndings. Based on the lit-
erature, both explanations are possible; it has been argued
thatactionco-representationpartlydependsontheperceived
overlap of one’s representation of the self and the repre-
sentation of the interaction partner (Mu ¨ller et al. 2011). In
addition,recentresearchdemonstratesthatthevalenceofthe
interaction inﬂuences action co-representation (Hommel
et al. 2009). However, a positive relationship with an inter-
actionpartnerincreasesself-otheroverlap(Aronetal.1991),
and it seems difﬁcult to disentangle positivity and self-other
overlap as the possible underlying mechanism. Further
research is deﬁnitely needed to clarify this issue.
Another minor problem of the present research design
might be that in-group/out-group membership correlates
with a perceptible distinction, i.e. hand colour, so one
might argue that our ﬁndings are inﬂuenced by these dif-
ferences, and not purely by group membership. Speciﬁ-
cally, effects of our ﬁrst study could be due to the fact that
the white hand was perceptually more similar to partici-
pants’ own hand, which may minimise the compatibility
effect during interaction with the black hand. Similarly, in
study II, taking the perspective of a black person may
prime participants to attend to the hand with a black skin
colour. However, recent research suggests that group-
membership and not physical similarity or familiarity is
primarily involved in inﬂuencing in-group biases (Avenanti
et al. 2010). Furthermore, comparable effects of perspec-
tive taking have been found in the absence of differences in
skin colour (Mu ¨ller et al. 2011).
Co-representation of our co-actors actions is an essential
part in successful interaction (Sebanz et al. 2006), with
people tending to more strongly co-represent actions of co-
actors from the same in-group, with whom one has a
positive relationship, and with whom one does not compete
(e.g., Hommel et al. 2009). It is possible that to categorise
another person as an in-group member might function as an
enhanced indication that this person is a co-actor, thereby
triggering the tendency to co-represent his or her actions.
While we cannot link the present ﬁndings to individual
differences in prejudice, recent research has shown that
individual levels of prejudice inﬂuences action co-repre-
sentation for out-group members, demonstrating that peo-
ple with higher levels of prejudice co-represent actions less
than people with low levels of prejudice (Gutsell and
Inzlicht 2009). The authors argue that because of these
differences in action co-representation ‘‘empathy may be
restricted to close others and, without active effort, may not
extend to out-groups, making them likely targets of pre-
judice and discrimination’’ (page S52). These ﬁndings are
additionally underpinned by research revealing that co-
representation of pain, as well as emotion recognition is
also restricted to in-group members (Avenanti et al. 2010;
Elfenbein and Ambady 2002; Xu et al. 2009). The present
research is, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst showing
that perspective taking may offer a solution: taking the
perspective of an out-group member not only decreases
stereotype accessibility and improves attitudes towards the
out-group but also improves coordination of actions on a
very basic level, thereby improving social interactions.
Fig. 3 Mean reaction times of
the joint Simon task during
interaction with a white agent
(a) and a black agent (b)a sa
function of story (in-group
member vs. out-group member)
and compatibility (compatible
vs. incompatible trials)
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